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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: Curing an
Apparent Waiver of Jurisdictional Defenses
Neifeld v. Steinberg'
Alleging a breach of contract for failure to sell and deliver shares
of stock, Neifeld commenced an action against Steinberg in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. One month
later, Steinberg removed the case to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to section 1441(a)
of Title 28 of the United States Code,2 and filed an answer asserting
lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and insufficient service
of process. In the same pleading Steinberg filed a permissive counter-
claim. Neifeld then moved to strike the defenses of personal juris-
diction, venue and service of process, asserting that Steinberg had
submitted to the court's jurisdiction by filing the counterclaim. Stein-
berg, in response to this motion, amended his answer to withdraw
the counterclaim. The court denied Neifeld's motion to strike, reason-
ing that since the counterclaim had been withdrawn, Neifeld was not
entitled to any advantage which would have existed if the counterclaim
had been maintained. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed, holding that since Steinberg had the right to dismiss his
claim voluntarily, he had not "utilized the District Court's facilities
in any meaningful sense"3 and, therefore, he had not waived his
right to assert any jurisdictional defenses. The court was breaking
new ground in so ruling.
DOES A GENERAL APPEARANCE ACT AS A WAIVER OF A
JURISDICTIONAL DEFENSE? THREE VIEWS
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
to make a jurisdictional objection, a party had to balance on the rope
of division between general and special appearance. 4 If he was found
to have acted in a manner inconsistent with his limited status under
1. 438 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1971).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (1970) provides: "[A]ny civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may
be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending."
3. 438 F.2d at 431. The court, relying on Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965),
had little difficulty in deciding that the question should be determined under federal
rather than state law.
4. "A general appearance is one whereby the party appears and submits to the
court's jurisdiction for all purposes, while a special appearance is made for the sole
purpose of questioning the court's jurisdiction." 6 C.J.S. Appearances § 1 (c) (1937)
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special appearance, he was said to have considered himself in court
for all purposes and to have waived his jurisdictional defenses by
general appearance. The filing of a counterclaim was held to act as
such a waiver on the theory that, since the defendant had invoked
the power of the court to resolve the dispute, he had submitted to the
court's jurisdiction for all purposes.'
In 1938, the Federal Rules were promulgated to simplify procedure
in federal courts.' Rule 12(b)' was adopted to allow the prompt
presentation of all defenses, thereby avoiding the delay incident to the
filing of successive motions.S With this purpose in mind, courts have
generally interpreted rule 12, especially subsection b, as abolishing the
distinction between special and general appearances so as to render
special appearances no longer necessary.' To this effect is the decision
in Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp.,"0 which
suggested that the problem of appearances had vanished with the
adoption of rule 12(b). In that opinion, Judge Marls disclosed a
general interpretation of the far-reaching effects this rule was expected
to have, stating:
A defendant need no longer appear specially to attack the court's
jurisdiction over him. He is no longer required at the door of
the federal courthouse to intone that ancient abracadabra of the
law, de bene esse, in order by its magic power to enable himself
to remain outside even while he steps within. He may now enter
openly in full confidence that he will not thereby be giving up
any keys to the courthouse door which he possessed before he
came in."
5. Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. J.B. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286 (1907).
6. See Monod v. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2d 1170 (10th Cir. 1969).
7. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) provides inter alia:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion ... (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process . . . . No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading
or motion.
8. See Sadler v. Pennsylvania Ref. Co., 33 F. Supp. 414 (W.D.S.C. 1940). See
also 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1342 (1969).
9. See, e.g., Harrison v. Prather, 404 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Davenport v.
Ralph N. Peters & Co., 386 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1967) ; Speir v. Robert C. Herd & Co.,
189 F. Supp. 436 (D. Md. 1960).
10. 139 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 740 (1944).
11. 139 F.2d at 874.
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The courts, however, have not unanimously applied this liberal
view," and a question remains as to whether the lesser defenses of lack
of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue and insufficiency of
service of process under rule 12(b) are waived when the defendant
includes a counterclaim in his answer. The Rules are not explicit on
the point; the Supreme Court has not yet directly decided the question
and the few lower court decisions on the point do not agree.
Three distinct theories have evolved from the opinions of courts
required to decide the issue of whether jurisdictional defenses are
waived when a counterclaim is filed. Some courts have held that any
counterclaim will waive jurisdictional defenses; others have distin-
guished between permissive and compulsory counterclaims, holding
that the former act as waivers but the latter do not; a third group of
decisions has treated filing of a counterclaim as not representing a
waiver of jurisdictional defenses.
The "Traditional" View: Counterclaim Acts as Waiver
Although their reasoning is not uniform, most courts which have
considered the issue have held that a counterclaim acts as a waiver
of all jurisdictional defenses. One approach taken is simply to state
the conclusion - asserting that it is well established that a counterclaim
acts as a waiver.13 This reasoning is interpreted by some commentators
as indicating that since the Federal Rules are silent on this issue, the
traditional doctrine of waiver still applies. 4
This conclusion finds support in Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 5
which was decided by the Supreme Court a short time after the
Federal Rules were promulgated. In that case, a Massachusetts cor-
poration had brought an action for breach of contract against a resident
of Ohio in the Superior Court of Massachusetts. The defendant then
removed the case to federal court and entered a general appearance
by pleading on the merits and asserting a counterclaim. The plaintiff
amended his complaint, adding a cause of action based upon a viola-
tion of the Clayton Act." The defendant objected to the amendment,
arguing that the Massachusetts district court did not have jurisdiction
12. See, e.g., Comment, Waiver by General Appearance: Impact of the Federal
and Florida Rules, 15 U. MIAmI L. REV. 269 (1961), for a view that special appear-
ance has in effect remained in federal procedure.
13. See Winslow Mfg. Co. v. Peerless Gauge Co., 202 F. Supp. 931 (N.D.
Ohio 1958); Hook & Ackerman, Inc. v. Hirsh, 98 F. Supp. 477 (D.D.C. 1951).
14. IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE WITH
FORMS § 370.2, at 536 (rules ed. C. Wright 1960).
15. 319 U.S. 448 (1943).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq. (1970).
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to decide the antitrust claim.' 7  The district court refused to allow
the amendment on jurisdictional grounds; the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that requirements of the Clayton Act were only concerned with
venue and that the defendant had waived his right to challenge the
venue by not seasonably asserting his objection. The Court reasoned
that by defending on the merits and filing a counterclaim, the defendant
had invoked and submitted to the jurisdiction of the federal court.
As support for this contention the Court cited Merchants Heat & Light
Co. v. J. B. Clow & Sons,'" decided prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules, implying that the doctrine which held that filing a
counterclaim would waive any jurisdictional defense had not been
changed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Other courts have reached the same conclusion by relying upon
a strict reading of the Rules to buttress their conclusion that the liberal
treatment of rule 12(b) does not apply to cases in which a counterclaim
has been asserted. The essential portions of 12(b) state:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required .... No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion.
The strict interpretation theory is that a careful reading of 12(b)
seems to indicate that a counterclaim acts as a waiver because the
terms "claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim" refer
back to "claim for relief in any pleading" rather than to "defense."
This construction relies on the fact that the terms "claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim" constitute an all-inclusive
list of the existing methods of stating a claim for relief; however, there
are many other defenses, including those listed in the subsequent part
of rule 12(b)' 9 and those listed in rule 8(c)." Therefore, a counter-
17. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefore in any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount
in controversy .... "
18. 204 U.S. 286 (1907).
19. The listed defenses of FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b) are: "(1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue,
(4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party."
20. Affirmative defenses of FED. R. Cirv. P. 8(c) include "accord and satisfaction,
arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bank-
ruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow
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claim is not a "defense or objection" which, within the purview of
rule 12(b), may be asserted along with other defenses or objections
without thereby being waived.2' Additionally, under this theory rule
8(c) is interpreted to distinguish explicitly between a defense and a
counterclaim, thereby showing that the two are not the same.
This view derives support from the fact that the rules allow filing
of a motion to assert the jurisdictional defenses prior to the filing
of an answer, which indicates to some courts that coupling a counter-
claim with the 12(b) defenses in the answer constitutes a waiver
of those defenses. One such decision was rendered in North Branch
Products, Inc. v. Fisher.' In that case, the plaintiff sought a declara-
tory judgment that it owned certain patents that had been issued to
the defendant. The defendant answered on the merits and counter-
claimed for infringement and for royalties. Sixteen months later, the
defendant made a motion to dismiss for lack of personal and subject
matter jurisdiction. The court, after sustaining its jurisdiction over
the subject matter, refused to dismiss the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction, relying on the fact that personal jurisdiction had been
obtained when the defendant sought affirmative relief by filing a
counterclaim.2" The defendant argued that since his counterclaim was
compulsory,24 the court's interpretation would have forced him either
to waive his jurisdictional defenses or to lose his right of action on
the counterclaim. The court found this argument unpersuasive because
servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver .... "
21. Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 23 F.R.D. 654, 656
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF, supra note 14.
22. 284 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 827 (1961), noted in
63 W. VA. L. REV. 287 (1961).
23. The doctrine has also been applied in cases wherein the defendant had not
raised the issue of venue prior to or coincident with the making of his counterclaim.
See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 312 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1962) (objection to
venue raised after motion for summary judgment and filing of a counterclaim);
Rubens v. Ellis, 202 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1953) (no jurisdictional question raised by
defendant) ; Textron, Inc. v. Maloney-Crawford Tank & Mfg. Co., 252 F. Supp. 362
(S.D. Tex. 1966) (venue objection raised after counterclaim filed). In these instances
the broad application of the doctrine may more properly be interpreted as covering
only the narrower fact pattern. See also Annot., 5 L. Ed. 2d 1056, § 7 (1961). Courts
generally contend that a defense such as personal jurisdiction should be raised early
in the pleadings, and that pleading a counterclaim prior to any such defense may be
interpreted as active pursuit of the defendant's claim, which seeks and invokes the
court's jurisdiction. Kincade v. Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Corp., 242 F.2d 328 (5th
Cir. 1957).
24. FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a) provides inter alia: "Compulsory counterclaims.
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim ...."
[VOL. XXXII
NEIFELD V. STEINBERG
the counterclaim could have been interposed after the defendant had
objected to personal jurisdiction or venue by a pre-answer motion
pursuant to rule 12(b). Under this procedure, if the defendant's
motion had been denied, a counterclaim pleaded subsequently would
not have waived the right to contest the issue of jurisdiction.2.
Furthermore, even if the determination of the factual issues raised
by the motion would have required the taking of testimony, a hearing
could have been set down prior to the filing of an answer. The court
concluded that if this practice were followed, the defenses, having been
seasonably raised before the assertion of the counterclaim, would have
been preserved, and the assertion of the compulsory counterclaim
would not have constituted submission to the court's jurisdiction for
purposes of appeal.26
The Middle Ground: Only Permissive Counterclaims Waive
Jurisdictional Defenses
The second view, that only a permissive counterclaim waives
jurisdictional complaints, has been developed by a number of courts
which adhere to the philosophy that since the Federal Rules did not
expressly describe the effect a counterclaim would have on the dis-
favored defenses of rule 12 (b), prior case law controls the issue. Courts
which adhere to this concept indicate that, since a compulsory counter-
claim was unknown prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, there
is merit in drawing a distinction between the effects of the two types
of counterclaims on the jurisdictional defenses. Under this rationale,
only permissive counterclaims 2 7 are treated as waiving the juris-
dictional defenses; to find that a compulsory counterclaim waived the de-
fenses would be less than fair play, because there is a difference between
a party who is compelled to assert a counterclaim under rule 13(a),
and a party bringing a claim under rule 13(b) who is indicating a
desire to use the forum to advance his own interests.28 For example,
in Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co.,2 9 the plaintiff
25. Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Dominion Elec. Corp., 365 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1966).
26. Accord, Beaunit Mills v. Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 23 F.R.D. 654
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) states: "Permissive counterclaims. A pleading may
state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Thompson, 80 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1948), aff'd, 180
F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1950). This was the first case to recognize the rule but there
was no discussion as to the reasoning behind the decision.
28. Hasse v. American Photograph Corp., 299 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1962).
29. 378 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1967).
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brought an action alleging breach of a settlement agreement. In his
answer the defendant denied the allegations as well as asserting that
the court lacked jurisdiction over his person. In addition, the defendant
counterclaimed for breach of the same agreement. The court disallowed
the jurisdictional defenses, disregarding the argument that the counter-
claim was compulsory and should, therefore, not be treated as a waiver
of his jurisdictional defenses. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court, holding that it had lacked jurisdiction over
the defendant's person. The reasoning of that decision was that, under
rule 13(a), if a party fails to plead his compulsory counterclaim, he
is held to have waived it and is precluded by res judicata from
bringing suit upon it again ;31 since in this situation, a party has no
alternative but to submit his compulsory counterclaim, it should not
constitute a waiver of any jurisdictional defense.
The "Liberal" View: No Waiver
The third view, that a counterclaim does not waive the 12(b)
defenses, has been developed in the belief that the Federal Rules
require both liberal interpretation and application, 3' and that literal
interpretations which tend to thwart justice are to be avoided. 3'2 The
rationale behind this viewpoint is that rule 12(b) expressly provides
that every defense available to a party, including a counterclaim, shall
be asserted in a responsive pleading and no defense is waived by being
joined with another," and that the Federal Rules were meant to
provide for the quick presentation of defenses without requiring that
a number of pre-answer motions be filed. 3'4 Thus, these courts conclude
that a functional, rather than a strict, interpretation of the Rules is
required to effect their underlying purpose of simplifying procedure
and providing swifter justice. Although nothing in rule 12(b) ex-
plicitly shields the jurisdictional defenses from waiver, since rule 12(h)
describes situations in which a waiver of these defenses will result,
30. Local 11, Elec. Workers v. G.P. Thompson Elec., Inc., 363 F.2d 181 (9th
Cir. 1966).
31. See, e.g., Holley Coal Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 186 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1950);
Pierkowskie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1944, amended, 1945).
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 1, in which the rule states that the Federal Rules are to be
construed to secure the just and speedy determination of every action, suggesting a
liberal outlook.
32. Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 426 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1970).
33. Kiel Lock Co. v. Earle Hardware Mfg. Co., 16 F.R.D. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
But cf. Beaunit Mills v. Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 23 F.R.D. 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
34. Sadler v. Pennsylvania Ref. Co., 33 F. Supp. 414 (W.D.S.C. 1940).
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adherents to the third view find it impermissible to treat a counterclaim
as such a waiver, because to do so would add an implied provision to
the methods of waiver which have been expressly listed in the rules.
It is possible that within the reasoning of this last classification
the better view may be found. To require a defendant to raise his
motion for jurisdiction first is to reinstate the concept of a special
appearance, contrary to the apparent intent of the rules.3 5 Furthermore,
it is undisputed that the defense of improper venue or lack of juris-
diction over the person may properly be coupled with an answer on the
merits,36 and, like the answer, the counterclaim may have been filed
only in case the jurisdictional defenses do not prevail. It would, there-
fore, seem that the same method of procedure would be justified in the
use of counterclaims as is used with an answer, especially since rule
12(d) permits a hearing on jurisdictional defenses upon request of
either party; thus, the plaintiff cannot object that he would be unable
to determine how to prepare his case. While the "middle ground" of
holding that only permissive counterclaims waive jurisdictional de-
fenses has surface appeal, it is not always a simple matter to distinguish
between permissive and compulsory counterclaims, 7 and a matter as
crucial as jurisdiction should not be decided on such a fine line.
CURING A WAIVER OF JURISDICTION BY AMENDMENT
OR WITHDRAWAL
The Neifeld court chose to avoid deciding the issue of whether
jurisdictional defenses are waived when a counterclaim is filed,"8
instead reasoning that since the counterclaim had been withdrawn, it
should be treated as never having been filed. Although the district
court reached this result by holding that the answer had been amended
35. See 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1959).
36. See, e.g., Untersinger v. United States, 172 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Blank
v. Bitker, 135 F2d 962 (7th Cir. 1943).
37. See, e.g., North Branch Products, Inc. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 827 (1961), wherein defendant contended that his
counterclaim was compulsory; the district court held that it was permissive [284 F.2d
at 6151 and the circuit court did not decide the issue. See also 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 13.13 (2d ed. 1968); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1410 (1971).
38. The court did express a view, in dictum, which approaches the more liberal
case holdings when it said:
While we agree that a defendant's case is even stronger for finding no waiver
when a jurisdictional defense is combined with a compulsory counterclaim, we do
not think that we should find a waiver simply because the counterclaim in the
instant case is not compulsory. Rule 13(b) does not place any restrictions on a
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as a matter of right, pursuant to rule 15 (a),39 the Third Circuit found
that the same result could more properly be reached by treating the
amendment as a voluntary dismissal pursuant to rule 41 (c). However,
regardless of which rationale is used, the case stands for the proposition
that as long as a responsive pleading has not been made, a counterclaim,
once withdrawn, will be treated as never having been filed.
This holding is clearly at odds with the law which existed prior
to adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under prior case
law, it was recognized that by proceeding to make a general appearance
before the issues raised at a special appearance had been settled, the
objection to jurisdiction was waived.4" In the leading case on this point,
Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. J. B. Clow & Sons,4 the Supreme
Court held that the defendant, by electing to sue upon his claim by
way of a counterclaim, assumed the position of a plaintiff invoking
the jurisdiction of the court and was thereby considered to have sub-
mitted to that jurisdiction. This view was later expanded in Automatic
Toy Corp. v. Buddy "L" Mfg. Co.,42 in which it was stated that a
general appearance constitutes consent to meet the case on the merits
and may not be retracted, and when the defendant couples in one
pleading his objection to venue and his defenses to the merits, the
objection to venue is waived by his general appearance. Whether this
reasoning has any strength today depends upon whether the Federal
Rules replaced all prior procedure.
defendant's right to assert a permissive counterclaim. Nor does Rule 13(b)
mentoi any untoward procedural results (such as waiver) which will be occa-
sioned by the assertion of a permissive counterclaim.
438 F.2d at 430 n.13.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides inter alia: "A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served ....
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court .... ." The plaintiff
in Neifeld argued that his motion to strike the defendant's jurisdictional -defenses
would prevent the defendant from amending as a matter of. right, but the court
properly recognized that a motion is not a responsive pleading. See, e.g., Fuhrer v.
Fuhrer, 292 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1961); Kelly v. Delaware River Joint Comm'n, 187
F.2d 93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951). Even if a motion had been
treated as a responsive pleading, rule 15(a) calls for the courts to grant leave to
amend freely. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). Therefore, the defendant would
probably have been allowed to amend if he had been required to obtain the court's
permission. See also Copeland Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 199 F.2d 566
(5th Cir. 1952). In that case, the court said a decision on a request for leave to amend
should not be influenced by whether an amendment would or would not relate back.
40. Western Loan Co. v. Butte & Boston Min. Co., 210 U.S. 368 (1908).
41. 204 U.S. 286 (1907).
42. 19 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd ment., 97 F.2d 991 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 305 U.S. 633 (1938).
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The Federal Rules do not directly answer this question; but the
spirit of that enactment was to simplify the complex procedural patterns
which existed before those rules were adopted. Thus it can be argued
that the new rules were intended to replace all prior rules. The Third
Circuit indirectly suggested this in In re United Corp.,43 in which
it stated that when a situation arises for which no solution has been
provided in the Federal Rules, a district court may regulate the practice
to be followed in any manner not inconsistent with the Rules. No
reference was made to prior law, and if this reasoning is sound, the
district courts would have complete discretion in procedural matters,
as long as their methods were within the spirit and pattern of the rules.
As was previously mentioned, the defendant in Neifeld argued
that the language of rule 15(c) required the court to treat defendant's
answer, after it had been amended by withdrawal of the counterclaim,
as if the counterclaim had never been filed. Rule 15(c) provides
essentially that whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth
in the original pleading, the amendment will relate back to the date
of the original pleading. Therefore, according to the defendant's
argument, any jurisdiction that may have attached with the filing of
the counterclaim would no longer exist.
Generally, the doctrine of "relation back" has been used to prevent
a claim from being barred by the statute of limitations. The judicial
philosophy behind it seems to be that a party who is notified of litiga-
tion concerning a given transaction or occurrence has been given all
the notice that the statute of limitations was intended to afford. If
the original pleading gave fair notice of the general fact situation
out of which the claim or defense arose, an amendment merely makes
more specific what has already been alleged, and the defendant is not
placed at any disadvantage with respect to the suit;44 therefore, an
amendment should relate back even though the statute of limitations
has run in the interim. 45
The courts have recognized that the Federal Rules generally call
for a liberal application of the doctrine of relation back,46 and it has
often been applied in contexts other than the running of the statute
of limitations.47 Thus, in Reynolds Jamaica Mines, Ltd. v. La Societe
43. 283 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1960).
44. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brown, 338 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1964).
45. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1968).
46. Id.
47. An example of such relation back may be seen in Junso Fujii v. Dulles, 224
F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1955), in which plaintiff's amendment to correct his pleadings
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Navale Caennaise,4s the court held that the withdrawal of a counterclaim
would relate back to the time the initial pleading was filed. In that
case, the plaintiff sought damages for an alleged breach of contract
involving the purchase of a ship. The defendant answered on the
merits and included a counterclaim in that pleading. The answer was
later amended to withdraw the counterclaim and to plead, as a separate
defense, an arbitration clause which would have deprived the court of
jurisdiction over the controversy.4" The plaintiff objected to the
amendment, asserting that the arbitration defense had been waived
by the filing of the counterclaim. The court rejected this argument
stating that "[o]nly a very strained application of law would permit
[the court] to hold that if a counterclaim is withdrawn, nevertheless,
having once been filed no defense inconsistent therewith may validly
be interposed, even though . . . no intervening rights arose by reason
of the original filing."5 However, although the doctrine of relation
back may be applied to more concepts than statute of limitations,
courts also recognize that it should not be applied as liberally "when
it will deprive a party against whom the amendment is made of a
substantial right, or impose upon such party a serious liability."'"
related back to the date of his original complaint, which was prior to the repeal of
the statute on which the suit was based. Accord, MacGowan v. Barber, 127 F.2d 458
(2d Cir. 1942).
48. 239 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1956).
49. Although the court concluded that the question presented was closely akin to
subject matter jurisdiction, it did state that if the case had been concerned with
personal jurisdiction, the filing of a counterclaim would have waived all rights to
object to that jurisdiction. Id. at 692. Furthermore, it seems axiomatic that if the
parties contract to deprive the court of jurisdiction over the controversy, they may,
either by agreement or by waiver, repudiate the effect of that contractual provision.
Cf. Industrial Trades Union of America v. Dunn Worsted Mills, 131 F. Supp. 945,
948 (D.R.I. 1955) ("The rule is well settled that at common law submission to arbi-
tration cannot be specifically enforced and either of the parties to the submission may
revoke it at any time before an award is made.")
50. 239 F.2d at 692.
51. United States v. Stromberg, 227 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1955). In this case, a
denaturalization proceding, the complaint recited that the defendant's "naturalization
was 'illegal and fraudulently procured'." After the complaint was filed but before the
case was heard, the Nationality Act of 1940, under which the action was brought, was
superseded by the McCarran Act of 1952. After the new law took effect, the Govern-
ment amended its complaint to add an additional ground for denaturalization based
upon the prior law. The Government argued that, although its allegations Would not
justify denaturalization pursuant to the McCarran Act, the amendment related back
to the time at which the original pleading was filed, and thus the claim fell'with-
in the protection of a provision which stated that the new act would not impair
prosecutions that were currently in existence. The Fifth Circuit upheld the district
court's refusal to allow the amendment to relate back because to do so would sub-
stantially impair the defendant's rights.
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The state of affairs presented in Neifeld falls squarely within the
situation in which the Federal Rules contemplated that an amendment
would relate back to the time at which the original pleading was filed.
The plaintiff in that case could not claim undue prejudice or hardship,
since his substantive rights did not differ from what they would have
been if the counterclaim had never been filed. Furthermore, since
Neifeld was fully aware of the defendant's objection to jurisdiction,
he could claim no surprise at the withdrawal of the possible waiver
of jurisdictional defenses. The Neifeld result, in this respect, is easier
to reach than the Reynolds Jamaica Mines decision, as to which it might
have been argued that the plaintiff assumed a waiver and was unfairly
surprised by the later request for arbitration. As expressed in Chamber-
lin v. United Engineers &' Constructors, Inc.,52 in reference to a plain-
tiff amending his complaint to correct deficiencies, the complaint is not
precluded from being amended merely because the other party may
subsequently lose as a result of the amendment. The other party
cannot rely on defects in pleading, because complaints are freely
amendable under the Federal Rules. 53
An argument may be made that controversies should be decided
on the merits and not on procedural niceties, wherever possible.14
In Neifeld, therefore, the amendment should not have been allowed to
relate back. While it is true that the courts will not adhere rigidly
to the Rules if the end result is to thwart justice,55 the right to dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper service of process or im-
proper venue is explicitly stated in the Rules and is therefore an
unqualified right56 that should not be withheld indiscriminately.57
52. 194 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
53. See also Schwartz v. American Stores Co., 22 F.R.D. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
There the court expressed the opinion that a defendant should not be penalized because
of an apparent oversight by counsel, the court contending that the "sporting" element
of pleading had been eliminated by the Rules.
54. See, e.g., Cooper v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 296 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.
1961) ; Green v. Walsh, 21 F.R.D. 15 (E.D. Wis. 1957).
55. Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 426 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1970).
56. See, e.g., Ulmer v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 380 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.
1967) (defendant has a right to dismissal if there is no personal jurisdiction) ; Read
v. Ulmer, 308 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1962) (defendant has an unqualified right to have
an order of dismissal entered when court has no jurisdiction over the defendant);
Schadl v. Boyer, 56 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (where service of process is
insufficient on an indispensable party, the action must be dismissed).
It should be noted, however, that there has been a move to limit lack of
venue as a defense. In 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1970), a means has been provided to
district courts for curing a defect in venue by allowing the court, if it finds it is in
the interest of justice, to transfer the case to the proper district rather than dismiss
the case. But it has been held that this statute was never intended as a means of
avoiding the consequences of failure to perfect service of process or as a device to
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Although, in Neifeld, the Third Circuit asserted the validity of
allowing the withdrawal of a counterclaim by amendment to relate back
to the time at which the original pleading was filed, it held that the
same result was more properly achieved by treating the amendment as
a voluntary dismissal. Since a voluntary dismissal5" leaves the parties
as if suit had never been filed, any jurisdiction the court may have
acquired over the defendant as a result of the counterclaim would be
extinguished, since the suit would then stand as it had stood prior to
the filing of the counterclaim.
Arguably, one difficulty may also be anticipated in the use of
voluntary dismissal. Under rule 41 (a) (2),"° after a defendant raises
a counterclaim, the plaintiff may no longer voluntarily dismiss his
pleading unless the counterclaim can remain before the court for
independent adjudication. The purpose of this rule is to preserve to
a defendant the jurisdiction of the court."0 The argument may then
be made that if filing the counterclaim preserves the defendant's juris-
diction, a defendant should be refused dismissal of his counterclaim
if that will have the result of costing the plaintiff his jurisdiction over
the defendant. The answer may be found in the Rules, in that rule
41 (c) applies only if the plaintiff has not replied to the counterclaim;
once the plaintiff replies, or evidence is introduced, there are no pro-
acquire personal jurisdiction not properly invoked. See Hohensee v. News Syndicate,
Inc., 286 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1961). Contra, Amerio Contact Plate Freezers, Inc. v.
Knowles, 274 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1960), in which the court said a district court has
the power to act on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) even if it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant's person, thereby using the statute as a device to
acquire personal jurisdiction. However, this statute is inapplicable to a case removed
from a state court to a federal court. Grimes v. Hull-Dobbs, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 151
(E.D. Ky. 1957). Also, a number of states that have adopted the Federal Rules
as a guide for their procedural rules have deleted lack of venue as a ground for
dismissal. See, e.g., MINN. R. Civ. P. 12.02; MONT. R. Civ. P. 12(b); NEV. R.
Civ. P. 12(b). See also Bistline v. Eberle, 85 Idaho 167, 376 P.2d 501 (1962).
. 57. Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissent in Freeman v. Bee Machine Co.:
"I quite agree with the Court that venue is a privilege that may be waived, that it
'may be lost by failure to assert it seasonably.' . . . But the waiver must be actual,
not fictitious. There must be a surrender, not resistance." 319 U.S. at 459 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
58. Dismissal would be through rule 41(c), which applies the provisions of rule
41(a) to the dismissal of a counterclaim. FEn. R. Civ. P. 41(a) provides in part:
"[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing
a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer...."
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (2) states in part: "If a counterclaim has been pleaded
by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss,
the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counter-
claim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court."
60. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Boe, 187 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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visions for the defendant to withdraw his counterclaim unless the
plaintiff consents. This would give the same effect to the plaintiff's
reply as rule 41(a) (2) gives to a counterclaim in preventing a
voluntary withdrawal.
It seems, therefore, that with respect to a waiver of jurisdictional
defenses, amendment and voluntary dismissal have the same effect."'
CONCLUSION
The "liberal" view supported by Neifeld v. Steinberg - that filing
a counterclaim does not waive jurisdictional defenses pleaded at the
same time - avoids the hazards of reinstating special appearances
on the one hand and deciding important jurisdictional issues on the
fine line between compulsory and permissive counterclaims on the
other. Such an interpretation is also more in keeping with the purposes
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than either the traditional
view or the "middle ground" endorsed by some courts. Criticism
may be raised that adoption of the liberal view would have changed
the result in the North Branch62 case, in which the objection to juris-
diction was filed sixteen months after the counterclaim. A strict inter-
pretation of the rule would at first glance seem to bring the North
Branch facts within Neifeld's coverage. However, rule 12 (h), which
provides that a party waives all jurisdictional defenses not presented as
motions or in his answer, would still create a waiver of the defenses
in that case. Also, all courts would probably interpret the defendant's
delay of sixteen months as unseasonable assertion of the defenses and
as active pursuit of the court's jurisdiction. In the absence of prejudice
to the plaintiff, however, the Neifeld decision would seem to represent
a logical step in encouraging prompt and straightforward adjudication
of the issues in a controversy.
61. Reynolds Jamacia Mines, Ltd. v. La Societe Navale Caennaise, 239 F.2d 689,
692 (4th Cir. 1956) ; accord, Etablissements Neyrpic v. Elmer C. Gardner, Inc., 175
F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
It should be noted that treating the withdrawal as a voluntary dismissal could,
in the long run, prejudice the rights of the defendant. Under rule 41(a), if the
defendant dismisses for a second time, the dismissal acts as an adjudication on the
merits and prevents the defendant from trying the claim in the future. Thus, if the
defendant had previously brought suit and dismissed the counterclaim, treating its
withdrawal to preserve jurisdictional defenses as a voluntary dismissal would pre-
clude him from reinstating the counterclaim in the event that his objections to the
court's jurisdiction were not sustained. Permitting the counterclaim to be withdrawn
by amendment would not subject the defendant to a similar disadvantage, and he
would be able either to reinstate his suit or to bring a separate action on his claim
in the future.
62. North Branch Prods., Inc. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 827 (1961).
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